ILSE Koch Senate Investigation and Its Legal Problems with Observations on Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, The by Koessler, Maximilian
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 23 
Issue 1 January 1958 Article 6 
1958 
ILSE Koch Senate Investigation and Its Legal Problems with 
Observations on Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, The 
Maximilian Koessler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maximilian Koessler, ILSE Koch Senate Investigation and Its Legal Problems with Observations on Double 
Jeopardy and Res Judicata, The , 23 MO. L. REV. (1958) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Missouri Law Review
Volume 23 JANUARY, 1958 NUMBER I
THE ILSE KOCH SENATE INVESTIGATION AND
ITS LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH OBSERVATIONS
ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND RES JUDICATA
A nv w KOESSLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ilse Koch was a defendant in the Buchenwald concentration camp
case.' She was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment but Gen-
eral Lucius D. Clay, then supreme commander of the American occupa-
tion forces in Germany, reduced her sentence to four years of imprison-
ment. This decision met with a most unfavorable reaction.2 There followed
an investigation by a committee of the United States Senate which held
hearings in the matter3 and thereupon published its self-styled "interim,"
actually final report.4
*Jur. D., Austrian University of Czernowitz, 1912; MA., Columbia University,
1941; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1945. Employed by U. S. Dep't of the Army as
attorney for war crimes trial and military government activities, 1946-49. Engaged
for many years in the practice of law in Vienna, Austria. Author of numerous articles
in American and European political science and legal periodicals. Member of the
California and New York Bars.
1. Officially styled "United States v. Josias Prince zu Waldeck," tried in Dachau,
Bavaria, April 11 to August 14, 1947.
2. CLAY, DEcIsIoN iN GERmiANY 254 (1950) wherein it is said: "Among the 1672
trials was that of Ilse Koch, the branded 'Bitch of Buchenwald,' but as I examined
the record I could not find her a major participant in the crimes of Buchenwald. A
sordid, disreputable character, she had delighted in flaunting her sex, emphasized by
tight sweaters and short skirts, before the long-confined prisoners and had developed
their bitter hatred. Nevertheless, these were not the offenses for which she was
being tried and so I reduced her sentence, expecting the reaction which came.... "
3. CONDUcT or IsLE KocH WAn Cans TRIAL, Hearings Before the Investigation
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments, conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution 189, 80th Congress, 2d Sess.; hence-
forth cited as "Hearings."
4. CoNDucT or ILSE KocH WAR CRms TRIAL, INTRmn REPORT, 80th Congress,
2d Sess.; henceforth cited as "Report!'
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The Senate investigation was unique as compared with at least most
of the other investigations by legislative committees5 because of the matter
to which it was devoted and the effect of the committee's recommenda-
tions. Its result was that Ilse Koch was tried de novo, this time before a
German court and jury, and sentenced de novo, this time for good, to
imprisonment for life.
Official copies of the most important parts of the record of that sub-
sequent German trial6 have been perused in preparation of this paper.
Another important source was, of course, the cited Senate record which,
among other interesting material includes the full text of the accusation
in the Buchenwald concentration camp case. 7 A discussion of certain legal
points related to that Senate investigation and its aftermath in Germany
is the main purpose of this study. But prior to taking up those jural
problems, the lineaments of Ilse Koch's evil character and nefarious
doings are drawn. This historical sketch, attempting a synthesis between
the facts established in the war crimes case and those only proven in
the subsequent German trial, includes features which were not part of
the record existing at the time of General Clay's decision, or at the time
of the Senate investigation.
5. See TAYLOR, GaAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS(1955).
6. Indictment dated May 10, 1950, signed by the then chief prosecutor at the
superior court in Augsburg, Dr. Hans Ilkow; judgment dated June 15, 1951, rendered
after a trial before a court and jury in Augsburg that lasted from November 27, 1950
to January 15, 1951; decision of the supreme federal court in Karlsruhe, dated April
22, 1952, rejecting Ilse Koch's appeal. The judgment dated June 15, 1951 is henceforth
cited as "German Judgment."
7. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1197. It is entitled "charge sheet," and expressly
indicates that a "violation of the laws and usages of war" is charged, names the
defendants, and in its extremely involved additional language avers that they "and
divers other persons, German nationals, or persons acting with German nationals,
during various periods between the 1st of September, 1939, and the 8th of May, 1945,
at or in the vicinity of Thuringia, Saxony, Hesse, the Rhineland, the Ruhr, and
Westphalia, Germany, acting in pursuance of a common design to commit the acts
hereinafter alleged, did, wrongfully and unlawfully, encourage, aid, abet, and parti-
cipate in the operation of Concentration Camp Buchenwald and its subcamps and out-
details, which operation included the wrongful and unlawful subjection of citizens
of the United States of America, Poles, Frenchmen, citizens of the Grand Duchy
of Luxemburg, Norwegians, British subjects, Greeks, Yugoslavs, citizens of the Soviet
Union, Belgians, citizens of the Netherlands, stateless persons, Czechs, and other non-
German nationals who were then and there in the custody of the then German Reich,
and members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German Reich
who were then and there surrendered and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody
of the then German Reich, to killings, beatings, tortures, starvations, abuses and
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A reader who has gullibly swallowed all of the sensational stories
about her that were published by the newspapers, which were not in
every respect in accordance with the proven facts,8 will miss in the fol-
lowing profile any reference to her alleged possession of articles made
of tattooed human skin, and even more, will miss any reference to the
alleged fact that merely to add to that perverse collection, prisoners
were put to death. There is, however, no place for this feature in a
detached, rather than uncritical account, since those allegations, if they
contain any element of truth, have never been proved.
In the poetic words of Lord Byron, there is no fact "without some
leaven of a lie."9 And Herman Melville, in his Moby Dick, observes
that "wild rumours abound wherever there is any adequate reality to
cling to." Rumor has a tendency to embroider on the true facts, to color
them by adding fictitious elements. This must have been particularly
so in the case of rumors about Ilse Koch, circulating, by means of the
grapevine, among concentration camp inmates who had reason to see in
her the devil incarnate.
There is no denying the fact that human-skin processing was offi-
cially practiced in the Buchenwald concentration camp for pseudo-
scientific purposes. But that Ilse Koch had any connection therewith was
not even alleged by the prosecution or shown by the judgment in the
subsequent German trial. The related evidence in the war crimes case
came from the mouth of two witnesses whose credibility was shaken by
most forceful impeachment and whose testimonies, apart from containing
striking inconsistencies, were not conclusive even on their face. Signifi-
cantly enough, the human skin feature is not even mentioned in the
Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate's summary of what appeared to 'him
as proved against her by the record of the Buchenwald war crimes trial.10
8. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 1112, 1113 (testimony of former Theatre Judge
Advocate, containing this passage: "Many newspaper articles appear to be based
upon the premise that... she was the principal moving force in the killing of inmates
to procure interestingly designed and colored skins to be used for lampshades and
for other decorative purposes. In my opinion the record of trial does not warrant
such conclusions").
9. "And after all what is a lie? 'Tis but-The truth in masquerade; and I defy
Historians, heroes, lawyers, priests, to put-A fact without some leaven of a lie."
BYRoN, DON JuAN, canto XI, stanza 37. See also WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, TRuTH iN
MASQUERADE (1951).
10. He thus summarized what he believed remained after discounting untrust-
worthy testimonies: "The evidence establishes that the accused reported inmates for
infractions and violations of camp regulations on several occasions; that she knew
severe punishments were customarily administered in similar cases; and that some
of the inmates she reported were severely punished. The accused personally beat
an inmate on at least one occasion." Hearings, supra note 3, at 1235.
1958]
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The tribunal in that case, in passing on the degree of her guilt, seems not
to have attributed much, if any importance, to that particular accusation.1 1
II. ILSE Koch An HER CONDUCT iN BuCHENWALD
Ilse Koch was a widow, pregnant with a child conceived after her
husband's death, when she appeared as a defendant in the Buchenwald
concentration camp case.' 2 In June 1937 she had married SS Colonel
Karl Koch, a close friend of the infamous Himmler. Shortly before their
wedding Colonel Koch had become Commandant of the Buchenwald
concentration camp. Three children, born in Buchenwald, were the off-
spring of their fateful marriage, and she seems to have played success-
fully the role of faithful wife, although she secretly entertained an
adulterous relationship with one of her husband's subordinates, a camp
physician.' s
Koch's brutal regime in Buchenwald came to an abrupt end in the
winter of 1941, when he was arrested on suspicion of having enriched
himself by an organized system of malversations. On intercession of
Himmler he was soon released from custody, though not reinstated in
Buchenwald. But in August 1943 he was rearrested. At that time Ilse
Koch was also taken into custody as an accomplice in his peculations.
Both were indicted and tried before an SS court, which in December
1944 found him guilty and sentenced him to death, but acquitted her.
His sentence was executed a few days prior to April 11, 1945, the date
of Buchenwald's occupation by American troops. She remained at large
until her arrest as a war crime suspect on June 30, 1945. Subsequently
she was tried in Dachau as the only female defendant in the Buchenwald
concentration camp case.
Her attitude toward Buchenwald prisoners shows the symptoms
of a strong sadistic proclivity. Testifying in the war crimes trial, she
described her conduct in Buchenwald as that of a housewife concerned
11. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1025 (testimony of former chief prosecutor in the
Buchenwald case, mentioning the "tenuousness of the proof" of the human skin
feature, and intimating that this part of the case carried no weight in the tribunal's
determination of her sentence).
12. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1027, 1084, and German Judgment, supra note 6,
at 50 (referring to the circumstances under which, while attending her trial as an
inmate of the war crimes prison in Dachau, she became pregnant). The child was
born subsequent to her conviction.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss1/6
KOCH SENATE INVESTIGATION
solely with the performance of her duties toward her husband and chil-
dren, but not interested in the conduct or treatment of camp inmates.
She claimed to have made reports against prisoners only in two instances,
in both of them on the ground of flagrant offenses personally affecting
her. But her testimony is strikingly rebutted by the credible part of the
evidence against her in the war crimes trial and to an even higher degree
by that abundant de novo evidence which was given credence in the sub-
sequent German judgment, as the result of a very careful discussion of
credibility matters. It appears therefrom that she intermeddled with the
treatment of prisoners in a most vicious manner.
Prisoners would come within the focus of her hostile observation
and the reach of her malignant initiative on various occasions, for in-
stance, when they worked in her house or in the garden attached thereto,
when she saw them laboring at outlying places through which she passed
while indulging in the sport of horseback riding, when she inspected the
construction, by prisoners, of a manege for her, or when she came across
a prisoner while she was walking in a camp street alone or with her
husband. On quite a few of such occasions she apparently looked for and
found something which she could pin on a prisoner as the basis of her
action in either causing him to be summarily mistreated right on the
premises and in her presence, or in herself assaulting him, usually with
her riding stick or whip, sometimes with her bare hand, or in reporting
him for punishment.
When she intended to denounce a prisoner, she would indicate this
intention by jotting down the number appearing on his prison garb. Her
reports were almost automatically followed by punishment which usually
consisted of lashing a prisoner a certain number of times on a whipping
table called the "Bock." She was well aware of the results of her reports
-in fact, she would often sadistically announce to a prisoner that she
would cause his "buttock to be softened." In the subsequent German trial
it was proved that in some instances she had incited her dog against a
prisoner. It was also proved that some prisoners died as a result of mis-
treatment provoked by her reports against them.
One of her numerous complaints against prisoners was occasioned
by serious misconduct in her house.14 Mostly, however, she acted under
14. A prisoner who, during her absence on a trip, was working in her house,
put on her underwear, housecoat, and shoes, opened bottles of wine that were stored
in the cellar, got heavily intoxicated, and smashed up pieces of furniture and crockery.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 1261, 1262, 1267, 1273, 1274.
1958]
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flimsy and even frivolous pretexts. For instance, she would report a
prisoner for punishment, or instigate his mistreatment in her presence,
by alleging that he had dared to gaze at her. Yet she herself, by the
sexually provocative attire in which she allowed herself to be seen by
prisoners, was bound to cause them to look at her.' 5
Il. VAiuwcE BETWEEN WAR CRmns AccusATioN AND PROOF?
The Buchenwald concentration camp case was not tried before the
Nuremberg "International Military Tribunal" nor was it one of the sub-
sequent Nuremberg trials conducted before courts exclusively composed
of civilian American judges, though officially entitled "Military Tri-
bunals."'16 It belonged to the category of war crimes trials that were
conducted in Germany by American military tribunals entitled "Military
Government Courts."'17 The fundamental principle that criminal guilt
must be established by proof beyond any reasonable doubt was followed,
or at least not intentionally disobeyed, in those proceedings.' 8 And, of
course, proof in a criminal case means proof of all the essential elements
of the charge. There may not be a variance between accusation and proof.
Was there such a variance in the war crimes case of Ilse Koch? Before
answering this question, the nature and the essential elements of the
accusation as set forth in the war crimes charge quoted before') must
be examined.
A. Nature and Limits of the Accusation
The offense charged was "violation of the laws and usages of war."
Since it was established for the category of war crimes trials to which
the Buchenwald concentration camp case belongs, that only offenses
15. The German Judgment, supra note 6, at 72, observes in this respect (writer's
translation): "The reports of the accused were mostly based on the flimsy ground
that prisoners had indecently, voluptuously, or otherwise improperly looked at her.
But in the opinion of the court, she provoked any such looking at her by her conduct
and by her kind of clothing, strongly accentuating her bodily features and only
moderately covering her body.... And she knew well what effect this would have
on men who had been detained in the concentration camp for years."
16. See Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 1949 Im'L CoNcmi.ioN 243,
257, 273, 363.
17. For an attempt to deal comprehensively with the general features of those
trials, see Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEo. L.3. 18-112
(1950). For the historical background of the existence, in the American occupation
zone of Germany, of two sets of war crimes tribunals operating under different rules,
see Fratcher, American Organization for Prosecution of German War Criminals, 13
Mo. L. l~v. 45-47 (1948).
18. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1080, 1109, 1110, 1172.
[Vol. 23
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under the "traditional" international law could be prosecuted,
20 that
clause does not cover the novel conception of internationally punishable
"crimes against humanity," which was applied in the Nuremberg trials
2 1
as well as in the trial against the major Japanese war criminals,22 and
which includes offenses committed by a national of a belligerent country
against his or her connational or connationals. In other words, since an
act victimizing a connational of the perpetrator is not a "violation of
the laws and usages of war" as understood by the "traditional" inter-
national law, it could not fall within the scope of accusation in a war
crimes trial of the category here involved, as was obviously meant to be
expressed by the specification of the national status of the victims -in
the quoted Buchenwald charge, despite a certain ambiguity of its wording
in this respect.2
3
Another important feature of the quoted charge is that it does not
accuse a defendant of having mistreated or killed a Buchenwald prisoner
of the specified national status, but accuses him or her of participation
in a common design resulting in such an administration of the Buchen-
wald camp whereby those prisoners were mistreated or killed. In this
connection attention must be called to the following.
Under Anglo-American law an agreement for an unlawful purpose
constitutes as such a crime called conspiracy,24 in some jurisdictions a
19. Note 7 supra.
20. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 66 and Koessler, supra note 17, at 37-50.
21. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 356, 358 (quoting London Charter of August 8,
1945 pursuant to which the case against Herman Goering et al. was conducted before
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, and Control Council Law No. 10
of December 20, 1945 which was applied in the subsequent Nuremberg trials).
22. Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, 1950 IwT'L CoxciLiATION 475, 484 (quoting Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 26, 1946, under which
major Japanese war criminals were tried).
23. On its face, the respective language is open to the construction that its
reference to the national status of the victims is merely a descriptive part, but not
a constituent element of the accusation. That it cannot have been meant, however,
but as a constituent element is elaborately discussed and persuasively shown in the
argument concerning the res judicata issue, German Judgment, supra note 6, at 35-40.
24. CLARK, Shn=LARY OF AMERIcAN LAW 118 (1947) (stating that "the crime of
conspiracy is committed by merely making the agreement"); 3 BuRDIcM, TE LAW OF
CamE 435 (1946) (pointing out that although ordinarily to constitute a crime there
must be some act in addition to the necessary mental element, "if two or more persons
agree to commit a crime, then, regardless of making or considering any plans for
its commission, and despite the fact that no step is taken by any of such persons to
carry out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who
joins in the agreement"); 2 WHARTON, CRIINAL LAW 1940 (12th ed. 1952). See also
the following statement in Sealfron v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948): "It has
long been recognized that the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy
to commit it are separate and distinct offenses."
1958]
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so-called "overt" act being required in addition to the bare agreement,
which overt act may, however, consist of something short of an attempt
as distinguished in criminal law from mere preparation.25 But this gen-
eral criminality, as such, of an agreement for an unlawful purpose does
not exist in the civil law systems,26 although certain special crimes may
be committed there by entering into an agreement or "complot," even
where this is not followed up by action pursuant to it.21
Since in the absence of any applicable specific rule of international
law, a tribunal supposed to adjudicate a matter under international law
can apply only such legal principles as are generally recognized among
the civilized nations,28 "traditional" international law does not include
a crime of "naked conspiracy" as is pointed out in the opinion of the
president of the tribunal before which the trial against the major
Japanese war criminals was conducted.29 However, a charge that a person
committed a substantive crime, for instance, homicide or assault, pursuant
to a common design, in other words, a charge merging the conspiracy
element with the particular offense actually committed pursuant to
the conspiratorial plan, scheme, or plot, is nothing peculiar to Anglo-
American law-rather it is in accordance with universally recognized
principles of criminal law.30
The accusation in the Buchenwald case was obviously meant in the
last mentioned sense, that is, as charging mistreatment and killing of
prisoners of war pursuant to a common design, and not as charging a
25. 11 AT. JuR., Conspiracy § 6, at 546, 547 (1937). See also BuRDicK, op. cit.
supra note 24, at 454-56.
26. "Many European jurists view the Anglo-Saxon concept of criminal conspiracy
with deep suspicion." TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 345.
27. KEwAN & BROWN, CRMMS AGAINST INTFRNATiONAL LAW 105, 107 (1950) (quot-ing French Penal Code, article 265, and pre-Nazi German Criminal Code article49 (b)). For the abolition by certain pre-Empire German legislation of the con-
spiracy-like crime of "Komplott," see WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1861.28. See references in art. 8, subd. 3 of "statute" of former Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, and art. 38 of "statute" of present International Court of Justiceto "the general principles of law recognized by the civilized nations."29. HORWrrz, supra note 22, at 554 (quoting part of that opinion wherein it is said,
among other things, that "it would be nothing short of judicial legislation for thisTribunal to declare that there is a crime of naked conspiracy for the safety of theinternational order"). For the conspiracy provisions in the charter of the InternationalMilitary Tribunal in Nuremberg, part II, art. 6 (a), and in Control Council Law No. 10(governing subsequent so-called Nuremberg trials), art 11-1(a), see TAYLOR, supra
note 16, at 356, 359; for the corresponding provision in the charter of the InternationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far East, see HoRwrrz, supra note 22, at 484.
30. To the same effect, 15 LAW REPORTS OF TaLS OF WAR CaRnNAns (United
Nations War Crimes Commission, 1949) 91, 95.
(Vol. 23
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common design as such. The words "and participate in the operation,"
which the quoted charge contains, are therefore not redundant, but are
an essential element of the accusation. This was obviously the assumption
on which the variance point was raised to which we turn now.
B. Variance Point Raised in Course of Post-Trial Review
In his post-trial review of the Buchenwald concentration camp case,
the Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate was assisted by three legally trained
members of his staff. In so far as Ilse Koch was concerned, these three
lawyers, as a result of their study of the file, unanimously suggested to
him that he should recommend setting aside her conviction on the ground
that she had had no assigned function in the "operation" of the camp,
participation in that operation being an essential element of the accusa-
tion set forth in the charge sheet.
The Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate was not swayed by this argu-
ment. He believed that her kind of conduct in Buchenwald brought her
within the scope of the "operation" element of the charge and accordingly
recommended confirmation of her conviction. 31 It would seem that this
was the better view. It is true that Ilse Koch had no official position or
function in the camp. But she arrogated to herself, and was at least by
acquiescence allowed, to exercise such a strong influence on the treat-
ment given to prisoners who came within her reach that this could well
be considered as de facto participation in the operation of the camp.
Because of the mentioned disagreement between the Deputy Theatre
Judge Advocate and his legal assistants and the fact that two of the latter
nevertheless co-signed his review, the Senate committee's report ex-
presses the suspicion that that recommendation may have been arrived
at as a compromise between the questions of guilt and sentence. 32 It would
seem, however, that there is no sound basis for that suspicion. There is
no reason to disbelieve the Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate's testimony
before the Senate committee that his recommendation was motivated by
his belief that the life sentence was excessive in view of the minor extent
and degree of Ilse Koch's participation in the Buchenwald atrocities, as
it appeared to him from that part of the evidence in the war crimes trial
which remained after the discounting of incredible parts thereof.33 He
31. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1115, 1155, 1175, 1235.
32. Report, supra note 4, at 17.
33. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1175.
1958]
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alone was in charge of the review and the recommendations to be con-
tained therein. He did not need the concurrence of his assistants, and
thus was not dependent on a compromise to take action disregarding their
opinion.
IV. THE PROBLIM OF REs JUDICATA
Before dealing with the particular res judicata issue involved in the
Ilse Koch case, we wish to submit certain terminological and compara-
tive law observations of a general nature on double jeopardy and res
judicata.
"Jeopardy" in its general meaning of danger or peril has an interest-
ing semantic derivation. It is a "pidginized" version of the French words
"jeu parti," literally translated "divided game," and referring to the
equal risk of loss incurred by two persons participating in a game of
chance fairly played. In its common law meaning, having been "once in
jeopardy" means having been brought to trial, for the offense involved,
in a criminal proceeding that had reached a certain initial stage satisfying
the legal requirements of jeopardy in its technical sense. The point at
which this stage is reached, or, as is usually said, when "jeopardy at-
taches," is generally defined with reference to a jury trial.84 It has, how-
ever, also been defined with reference to a trial by a court without a
jury.35
From all these definitions it appears that as understood in modern
law it is not essential to "once in jeopardy" that there has been an adjudi-
34. "A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put on trial, before a court of
competent jurisdiction, on an indictment or information which is sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and a jury has been charged with his deliver-
ance. A jury is said to be thus charged when it is impaneled and sworn." 15 A. Jun.,
Criminal Law § 369, at 46 (1938). See also similar definition in 1 WtARToN, op. cit.
supra note 24, at 541, 544.
35. "Jeopardy attaches in a case without a jury when the accused has been
subjected to a charge and the court has begun to hear evidence." Hunter v. Wade,
169 F.2d 973 (1948); Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (1939). See also Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904), where it is said: "It is true that some of the definitions
given by the text-book writers, and found in the reports, limit jeopardy to a second
prosecution after verdict by a jury; but the weight of authority, as well as decisions
of this court, have sanctioned the rule that a person has been in jeopardy when he is
regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to
try him, certainly so after acquittal."
10
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cation of guilt or innocence in the former trial for the same offense.30
This has not always been the case. Under the original common law of
England the plea of former or double jeopardy could be raised only in
the form of either the plea autrefoits convict or the plea autrefoits acquit,
in other words only on the theory that there had been a conviction or an
acquittal.37
A particular provision on former jeopardy, based on the correspond-
ing provision in the Articles of War,3 8 is contained in the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.39 It prescribes in part that no proceeding in which
an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or
specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of former jeopardy
"until the finding of guilty has become final after review of the case has
been fully completed. '40 Since it seems to be settled that the constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy applies also in a proceeding
before a military tribunal,41 the question arises whether the cited code
36. See Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 350, 356, 74 P.2d 243, 247, (1937)
(quoting with approval from 8 Ruling Case Law 138: "But as soon as a jury has been
impaneled and sworn jeopardy attaches, and a dismissal of the case, when not
authorized by law and without the consent of the defendant, after the jury has been
sworn and the trial actually commenced is equivalent to an acquittal of the charge
and will constitute former jeopardy on a subsequent trial on the same charge"). See
also 4 BLACKSTONE, CoLMnIENTAIEs *336 where it is said that "the plea of autrefoits con-
vict, or a former conviction for the same identical crime, though no judgment was
ever given, or perhaps will be ... is a good plea in bar to an indictment."
37. Miller, The Plea of Double Jeopardy in Missouri, 22 Mo. L. REv. 162, 165, 166
(1957).
38. Art. 40, reading in part: "No person shall, without his consent, be tried a
second time for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has been
found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification shall be held to be
a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be one, the con-
firming authority shall have taken final action upon the case." MANUAL Foa CoURTs
MARTTAL U. S. A=v 284 (1949).
39. U.C.M.J., art. 44(b), 10 U.S.C.A. § 844(b) (Spec. 1956 Pamph. containing new
title 10).
40. See United States v. Werthman, 18 C.M.R. 64, 68 (1955) where the Court of
Military Appeals says that U.C.M.J., art. 44 "sets out the military law in that field
and ... indicates that that defense may be sustained only where there has been a
termination of proceedings by a judicial act of some recognized form or a trial of
the accused on the merits."
41. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, rehearing denied 337 U.S. 921 (1949); Wrublew-
ski v. McInerney, 166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948), disapproving on this point, though
otherwise affirming, In re Wrublewski, 71 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1947); 36 Am. JuR.,
Military § 104.5 (Cum. Supp. 1956). Cf. United States v. Zimmerman, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 12,
6 C.M.R. 12, 17 (1952), where the Court of Military Appeals, after referring to Wade
v. Hunter, supra, says, "However . . . we hesitate to accept that decision as the
Supreme Court's definite and final ruling on the issue. .. ."
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provision is constitutionally valid in so far as it deviates from the general
conception of when jeopardy attaches.42
Even under the general law on "once in jeopardy," that defense does
not lie if in the former trial the jury was properly discharged before
rendering a verdict 43 or because of failure to agree on a verdict.44 The
protection against double jeopardy is, on the other hand, enlarged by
the generally recognized rule that there cannot be an appeal by the
prosecutor from a judgment acquitting the defendant, since this would
amount to placing him twice in jeopardy for the same offense., Actually,
the appeal stage of the proceeding is not a second trial, but a continuation
of the same trial, as is pointed out, in effect, in a judicial opinion re-
presenting the minority view that an appeal by the prosecutor from an
acquittal has nothing to do with double jeopardy.46 A Connecticut statute,
enabling the prosecutor to appeal from an acquittal,47 has been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court as constitutionally valid against the
objection that it was in violation of due process of law.4 8
Different from the doctrine of "once in jeopardy" or "former
jeopardy," which does not exist in the so-called civil law system, for
instance not under German law,49 is the criminal law branch of the
doctrine of res judicata. 50 This doctrine, even under the common law
42. Touched upon, but expressly left undecided, by the United States Supreme
Court in note 4 of its opinion in Wade v. Hunter, supra note 41.
43. Miller, supra note 37, at 245; 15 Am JuR., Criminal Law § 406 (1938).
44. Miller, supra note 37, at 260.
45. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204 (1957) ("it is
one of the elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure
a new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear erroneous");
15 Am. Jua., Criminal Law § 433 (1938); Miller, supra note 37, at 295, 296.
46. State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945). See also State v. Lee,
65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894), and the most forceful argument against the majority
view presented by Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486
(1927). As mentioned in Green v. United States, supra note 45, Holmes' dissent in
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), from the holding that the Government
could not appeal an acquittal in a criminal prosecution, was based on the argument
that there was only one continuing jeopardy until final decision of the case, no matter
how many times the defendant was tried.
47. ComN. GEN. STAT. § 8812 (1949) (numbered 6494 at time of decision, note
48 infra).
48. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
49. See Wolff, Criminal Justice in Germany, 43 McH. L. Rzv. 155, 171-72 (1944).
50. "Briefly stated, this doctrine is that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a matter within
its jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other
actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jursdiction, on the
points and matters in issue and adjudicated in the first suit." 2 FREE AN, JUDGAENTS
1322 (5th ed. 1925). For distinction between res judicata as applied in criminal cases
and double jeopardy see 14 CAL. Jur. 2d 419, 420, and cases there cited.
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system, is applicable not only in civil but also in criminal cases,51 al-
though in criminal cases in countries under the common law system it
is for most practical purposes eclipsed by the more effective doctrine of
former jeopardy. It supplements, however, the protection there extended
by the prohibition of double jeopardy in the following two respects.
In a prosecution of the same defendant, but for a different offense,
it estops the raising of issues that have been finally adjudicated in the
defendant's favor in his former trial.52 Also, where there has been a final
judicial discharge of the defendant prior to the attaching of jeopardy, it
prevents his being prosecuted de novo for the same offense.5 s
Disregarding certain technical refinements of the double jeopardy
doctrine, for example the determination of when jeopardy attaches and
the effect of a proper discharge of the jury, the theoretical difference
between the respective effects of the two principles in a criminal case
would seem to be the following. Res judicata prevents the raising, in a
subsequent proceeding against the same defendant, of an issue, including
the question of guilt or innocence, which has been finally adjudicated in
a prior proceeding. The prohibition of double jeopardy prevents a new
prosecution for an offense for which the person has been definitely placed
on trial in a prior proceeding under a valid accusatory pleading and
before a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, irrespective of
whether there has or has not been an adjudication of guilt or innocence
in that former trial.
In the civil law countries, which, as mentioned before, do not have
the jeopardy doctrine, res judicata54 protects a person against being pro-
secuted de novo for an offense of which he has in a former proceeding
been finally convicted or acquitted or otherwise been discharged on the
51. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426
(1922); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). See also Doctrine of Res
Judicata in Criminal Cases, 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943); Schmidt, Res Adjudicata (sic) in
Criminal Cases, 26 CALIF. ST. B.J. 366 (1951).
52. United States v. Williams, supra note 51.
53. United States v. Oppenheimer, supra note 51; State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162,
46 S.W. 1099 (1898); 15 Am. Jua., Criminal Law § 367, at 45 (1938). See also the state-
ment by Miller, supra note 37, at 162, that "the doctrine of res judicata . . .was
formulated into the criminal procedure as a complementary principle to the plea of
former jeopardy."
54. Derived from Roman law, according to BouVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 2910 (8th
ed., Rawle's rev. 1914); according to BLAck, LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1951) "a
phrase of the civil law"; according to State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894),
"a principle common to all systems of jurisprudence."
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ground of established innocence or failure of proof of guilt. Only to this
extent, and only with the important qualification mentioned immediately
below, does he receive from the res judicata principle the protection in-
herent in the common law doctrine of former jeopardy.
While there cannot be res judicata without finality of the prior
adjudication,5 6 even though there is a final acquittal the statutes of
certain civil law countries, including Germany and Austria, but not
France, qualify the defendant's protection inherent in res judicata by
allowing a reopening of the prosecution of the defendant on specified
grounds and within a specified period of time following final acquittal.
Those grounds include a credible confession made subsequent to his
trial by the person acquitted and discovery that the acquittal was based
on a forged document or on perjured testimony.5 7 A general feature of
the criminal procedure in civil law countries is that the public prosecutor
may appeal from an acquittal. 58
We now turn back to the Ilse Koch case. When in the course of the
Senate investigation the suggestion was voiced that General Clay's deci-
sion should be set aside and replaced by a new decision reinstating the
original life sentence, army representatives invoked in effect, though not
in terms, the principle of res judicata as the ground for their opinion that
action according to that suggestion would be highly improper. The cor-
rectness of their position is recognized in the committee's report. 0
55. Wolff, supra note 49.
56. RESTATEMENT, JUDGIENTS § 41, at 161 (1942).
57. German law: Wolff, supra note 49; BRITISH FoaEiN OFFICE, MANUAL or GEn-
mAN LAw 154 (1952) (the latter publication mentions, however, only subsequent
credible confession as ground for reopening); Austrian law: CODE O CRIAMHNAL PRocE-
DURE § 355.
58. German law: Wolff, supra note 49; French law: Wright, French Criminal
Procedure, 45 L.Q. REv. 92, 108, 109 (1929); Austrian law: CODE OF CnnINAL PROcE-
DURE § 281. The Austrian law recognizes, however, the independent principle of no
reformatio in pejus according to which on reversal of a conviction as a result of an
appeal by the defendant no more severe sentence may be meted out in the new trial
than was imposed by the reversed judgment. See LOHSING, DAS VERBOT DER REFolIA-
TIO IN PEJUS 1AT STRAFVERFAHREN (1907). Contrariwise, in this country a defendant who
was sentenced only to life imprisonment might, on retrial as the result of his appeal,
validly be given a death sentence for the same offense. This actually happened in a
California case. People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907). See also Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), discussed as to this aspect by the dissenting opinion
in Green v. United States, supra note 45.
59. Report, supra note 4, at 21, where it is said, "Representatives of the military
establishment testifying at the hearings ... took the position that to violate the rule
of finality of decision in this case would be contrary to well-established principles of
criminal jurisprudence . . . this subcommittee does not disagree with the position
taken by the military authorities...."
[Vol. 23
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That report expresses the view, however, that the finality of the
adjudication of flse Koch's war crimes guilt should not prevent her being
tried de novo before a German court for crimes under German criminal
law committed against German inmates of the Buchenwald concentration
camp, since she was prosecuted in the American trial only for crimes
under international law committed against prisoners of other than Ger-
man nationality. In other words she was not prosecuted for offenses of
the same kind as would be the subject of the suggested subsequent
prosecution. 0 The Bonn government acted accordingly and in the sub-
sequent de novo proceeding the plea of res judicata was held unfounded,
as the result of an interesting reasoning contained in that part of the
judgment which is entitled "Verbrauch der Strafldage" (exhaustion of
the state's right to prosecute).61
The court's discussion of the problem starts with the statement that
flse Koch's acquittal in the SS trial could not be the basis of a defense
of res judicata since she was not tried there for her conduct against
prisoners, but only for having been an accomplice in her husband's
peculations, the requirement of identity of subject matter thus not being
satisfied. The court's opinion then proceeds to examine whether res
judicata could be inherent in a judgment passed by an American war
crimes tribunal, the German law being that a judgment rendered in a
foreign jurisdiction has no res judicata effect in a proceeding before a
German court. On this preliminary point the court reaches the conclusion
that a judgment of a tribunal set up in Germany by an occupation power
must, pursuant to international law, be given the same res judicata effect
as a judgment of a German court, and that this applies also to a judgment
of a war crimes tribunal.
The opinion then turns to the merits of the particular res judicata
plea raised by defense counsel on behalf of flse Koch. In this connection
two things were beyond dispute: that the war crimes charge had accused
her only of an offense of victimizing prisoners of other than German
nationality and that the German de novo indictment charged her only
with offenses committed against prisoners of German national status.
Defense counsel referred, however, to the undeniable fact that in the
Buchenwald concentration camp trial, including that part which con-
60. Report, supra note 4, at 24.
61. German Judgment, sul-ra note 6, at 31-43.
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cerned Ilse Koch as a defendant, evidence of unlawful treatment of
camp inmates was introduced irrespective of the nationality of the victims
involved-their nationality in some instances not having been established,
in others having been German. 62 From this, counsel concluded that the
limitation of the accusation set forth in the charge sheet was not adhered
to in the course of the trial proceedings, that the prosecution in the
latter extended also to offenses against prisoners of German nationality,
and that consequently such offenses were included in the basis of her
war crimes conviction.
In holding this argument unsound and rejecting the res judicata
plea based on it, the judgment of the superior court in Augsburg in
substance reasons as follows: The accusation as limited in the charge
sheet, and not the kind of evidence introduced in the course of the trial,
must be looked at in determining what the subject of the prosecution in
the war crimes trial was. Moreover, from the fact that evidence was in-
troduced irrespective of the national status of the victim involved it does
not follow that the prosecution, as a matter of fact, was not limited to
offenses against prisoners of other than German nationality. Evidence
of incidents involving German prisoners may have been used merely to
prove the over-all element of the war crimes charge-administration of
the Buchenwald camp in a manner subjecting inmates, including foreign-
ers, to unlawful treatment. This reasoning is of course highly technical
and sounds unrealistic, but it may nevertheless be correct. It was upheld
by the supreme federal court in Karlsruhe in rejecting Ilse Koch's appeal.
V. WEIGHING OF CREDIBILITY IN EXCESS OF
PROPER ScoPE OF PosT-TRiAL REvi w?
Since the hue and cry in the Ilse Koch case was directed against the
reduction, on post-trial review, of the life sentence meted out to her by
the war crimes tribunal, the investigation by the Senate committee
centered on the question whether proper methods were applied in that
post-trial review. In this connection particular attention was given to
the fact that the reviewers, in adopting a factual basis for their recom-
mendations, discounted certain testimonies which they considered devoid
62. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1167 (testimony of the former Deputy Theatre
Judge Advocate: "The indictment, or the particulars, only covered crimes against
non-Germans but in practice testimony of atrocities against Germans was admitted
on the theory of the course of conduct").
[Vol. 23
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of credibility. In the course of the committee's hearings this action was
criticized by the committee's legal counsel as having been in excess of
the proper scope of post-trial review. It was alleged that in weighing the
credibility of evidence the reviewers unduly disregarded the limits of
review ordinarily exercised by an appellate court. Similar observations
appear in the committee's report. In an attempt to show that this criti-
cism had no sound foundation, we must elaborate what is briefly indicated
in a recent opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court: "Reviewing authorities
have broad powers under military law."6 3
A. The Requirement of Command Approval and Its Implications
Two features so fundamentally distinguish a military judgment from
that of a civilian court, and post-trial review in a military case from
ordinary appellate review, as to render an argument based on analogy
limping. The one is the traditional requirement of command approval,64
which has been retained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
which impresses on a judgment passed by a military tribunal the char-
acter of a merely inchoate rather than complete adjudication. The other
is the broad scope of that command review which extends far beyond the
review ordinarily exercised by an appellate court and which, according
to the leading textbook on principles of military law, gives the judgment
of a military tribunal the intrinsic nature of "a recommendation only.105
63. Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 574 (1957), citing, in note 5, Fratcher,
Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. REv. 15 (1949). See also
Connor, Reviewing Authority Action in Court-Martial Proceedings, 12 VA. L. Rzv.
43 (1925); Currier and Kent, The Boards of Review of the Armed Services, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 241 (1953).
64. WALKER, MImrrAY LAW 359-65 (1954). See also United States ex rel. Toth v.Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), wherein it is said that "strides have been made
toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department
which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them," but that "from the very
nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty
of people than do military tribunals."
65. Wi THROP, MiTLrARY LAw Am PREcEmESN *683 (2d ed. 1896, reprinted by
Gov't Printing office in 1920). See also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra
note 64, at 17, where it is said that there is "nothing in the history of constitutional
treatment of military tribunals which entities them to rank along with Article I
[of the Constitution] courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people
charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or pro-
perty." State ex rel. Madigan v. Wagener, 74 Minn. 518,.519, 77 N.W. 424, 425 (1898)
states that courts-martial are "an executive agency, and belong to the executive,
and not the judicial, branch of the government," citing Wnr-noP, op. cit. supra.
36 Am. Jun., Military § 88, at 244 (1941), points out that "while courts-martial may
and do discharge judicial functions, and are therefore in a certain sense courts, they
are not a part of the judiciary department of the government." Cf. Runkle v. United
States, 122 U.S. 543, 555 (1887), mentioning that "a court-martial organized under
19581
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As most clearly appears in cases where finality of adjudication is
reached because of the absence of an appeal filed within the time limited
by statute, the judgment of a civilian trial court stands on its own feet,
being in itself a complete, and not merely an initial form of, adjudication,
although it may be put out of existence as the result of an appeal.0 6 The
settled practice of appellate courts in this country is not to disturb the
trial court's weighing of conflicting evidence, except where a finding of
the trial court is "clearly against the weight" or "clearly against the
preponderance" of the evidence.67
All this is different in the field of military jurisdiction. A judgment
of a military tribunal does not go into effect unless or until it has been
approved by the military commander who is vested with the power
variously referred to in military parlance as that of the appointing, con-
vening, reviewing, approving, or confirming authority or officer. Such a
judgment is not definite-it is merely a tentative adjudication. Or, refer-
ring to language used in the previously cited textbook, "The record of
the court is but the report and opinion of a body of officers, addressed to
the superior who ordered them to make it, and such opinion remains
without effect or result till reviewed and concurred in, or otherwise acted
upon, by him." 68 Even in the absence of a petition therefor or of any-
thing else in the nature of an appeal, the case must be submitted to the
reviewing authority for approval or disapproval of the judgment, this
final decision being made by the military commander in charge only after
the trial record has been reviewed by a member or members of his legal
staff, whose opinions and recommendations are, however, not binding on
him, but merely advisory. He has the discretionary power to act accord-
the laws of the United States is a court of special and limited jurisdiction"; McLean
v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.S.C. 1947), stating that "courts-martial are
lawful tribunals existing under the Constitution and acts of Congress having plenary
jurisdiction of offenses committed to them by the military law"; United States v.
Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953), where it is said that courts-martial are
courts of special and limited jurisdiction, the proposition that they are instruments
of executive power being "the older concept."
66. For "automatic" appeal see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (b) (1956), providing that
"when upon any plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically
taken by the defendant without any action by him or his counsel."
67. 3 Am. JuR., Appeal and Error § 901, at 471 (1936).
68. WNTHRoP, op. cit. supra note 65, at *683. See also the statement in a reported
opinion of a Department of the Army Review Board, United States v. Moore, ACM
4433, 5 C.M.R. 438, 444 (1952), that it is the subsequent approval of the convening
authority (and the additional approval, when required, of other reviewing authorities
and appellate agencies) "which actually breathes life and effectiveness into the
findings" of a court-martial.
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ing to his own best judgment, in the light of the facts as found and the
law as understood by him.69 He may affirm or set aside a conviction
and, where he affirms it, either approve or reduce the sentence announced
by the tribunal.
Now, what is most important for the present purpose, his power, and
thus also the function of those who legally assist and advise him in its
exercise, extends to credibility matters, including the weighing of con-
flicting evidence, although in most cases the assumption is indulged that
the tribunal made a proper determination of the credibility of witnesses
whose demeanor it had the benefit of seeing and observing.7 0 This has
always been settled practice 71 and is incorporated as a statutory rule in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.1 2
An attempt in the course of the Senate investigation, to show the
contrary by quoting a certain passage from the previously cited text-
book,73 must be considered as abortive since that passage is merely
descriptive of the usual qualifications of officers acting as members of
courts-martial, but is not meant by implication to challenge the settled
principle, expressly stated by the learned author in the proper con-
nection,7 4 that post-trial review includes credibility matters.
B. The Review in the Ilse Koch Case
The so-called Military Government Court before which the Buchen-
wald concentration camp case was tried, had the legal nature of what
in American military law is termed a "military commission." 75 It was an
69. Wnnmop, op. cit. supra note 65, at * 687. See also Runkle v. United States,
supra note 65, at 557, where it is said that "his [the reviewing commander's] personal
judgment is required."
70. WinnTmoP, op. cit. supra note 65, at *691. Compare the interesting observa-
tions on the danger of fallibility of "demeanor evidence" in the late Jerome Frank's
posthumously published book, NOT GuiLTn 216-18 (1957).
71. MLNUAL FOR CouRTs MARTIAL U.S. Amaiy 93 (1949); SCHILLER, MIITARY LAw
AND DEFENSE LEGISLATiON 485 (1941).
72. U.C.M.J., art. 66(c), 10 U.S.C.A. § 866 (Spec. 1956 Pamph. containing new
title 10). See WALKER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 360, 725.
73. WiNTHROP, op. cit. supra note 65, at *546, where it is said, "A court martial,
by reason of the superior education and intelligence of the members, is a species ofjury which should be peculiarly qualified for the discriminations and comparisons
necessary to be made in estimating the relative weight and credibility of oral testi-
monies."
74. See note 69 supra.
75. See Koessler, supra note 17, at 55-58.
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American, not an international court,76 although supposed to apply the
"traditional" international law in adjudicating war crimes. 77 It was
subject to certain special regulations which, however, had taken over the
substance of the above stated general military law on the requirement of
command approval and the scope of the power of the reviewing
authority.78
It is true that those regulations did not specifically cover the question
of whether the review should extend to an examination of the credibility
of evidence. But the general principles of military law were considered
as of supplementary applicability. And it was thus the understanding of at
least those highest in rank among the judge advocate officers in the
theatre that the credibility review feature of the courts-martial law was
applicable as a matter of course.79
Such was also the understanding of General Lucius D. Clay, who
exercised the described command power in the Buchenwald concentration
camp case. 0 The trial record was reviewed for him first by the Deputy
Theatre Judge Advocate for War Crimes, then by the Theatre Judge
Advocate himself, and thereupon by a review board.81 But the recom-
mendations of the Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate were adopted by the
subsequent reviewers and thus formed the basis of General Clay's deci-
sion to affirm her conviction, yet to reduce her life sentence to four years
of imprisonment.
The proper weighing of the credibility of evidence was a most impor-
tant, though not always sufficiently heeded, part of the responsibility of
those in charge of the adjudication of war crimes, especially since in those
trials the exclusionary rules of evidence were not applied and types
of evidence were admitted that would have been inadmissible under the
exclusionary rules.82 In so far as evidence produced against Ilse Koch
76. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (dealing with similar
American military commission in China), disapproved on other grounds in Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
77. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 66.
78. Regulation oan Military Commissions, pars. 12 ,13, 15, and Regulation on Mili-
tary Government Courts, par. 5, both issued by Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European
Theatres, and quoted by Koessler, supra note 17, at 106-112.
79. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1098, 1111, 1112.
80. Id. at 1015 (telegram from General Clay wherein he says, "In these reviews
I must base my action on the evidence as it is evaluated by the reviewing authori-
ties").
81. Id. at 1028.
82. Koessler, supra note 17, at 69-77.
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was concerned, it included various kinds of hearsay, such as written state-
ments of persons who did not appear as witnesses and whose allegations
could thus not be tested by cross-examination, and testimonies on con-
centration camp rumor. Moreover, in the concentration camp cases the
bulk of the witnesses consisted of former camp inmates who, naturally
biased against the defendants, were not always aware of their respon-
sibilities as witnesses when attempting to "cooperate" with the prosecu-
tion. All this had, of course, to be kept in mind by the reviewers in con-
scientious discharge of their duties.
In the Ilse Koch case they disbelieved four witnesses. The extreme
lack of credibility appears even on the face of the testimonies of two of
these witnesses and the reviewers had extrinsic reasons to discount the
testimonies of the other two. In the light of the remainder of the evidence,
they considered four years of imprisonment a sufficient punishment and
they so recommended. Referring thereto, an official memorandum of the
Judge Advocate General reaches the conclusion that "there was no abuse
of discretion in the reduction of the term of confinement to four years."8 13
And the report of the Senate committee, while expressing severe
strictures on the reduction of the life sentence, expressly states that it
was an error committed in good faith, as there could have been an honest
difference of opinion on this matter.8 4
C. The Sentence Quandary
When, as in the war crimes cases, the range of applicable punishment
is unlimited, neither a minimum nor a maximum sentence being provided
for,8 5 those supposed to exercise their discretion in meting out a sentence
appropriate to the particular case may easily err, indeed, either by being
too severe or by being too lenient. According to the previously cited
memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, a "substantial sentence to
confinement" was proper in the Ilse Koch case, "the exact amount being
determinable as a matter of judgment based on an honest evaluation
of the degree of guilt."8 But, as to the degree of her guilt, there could
be a reasonable difference of opinion as would seem to be illustrated by
the fact that while the tribunal in her war crimes case was unanimous
83. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1254.
84. Report, supra note 4, at 22.
85. See GLmECK, WAR CRamNAw 107, 108 (1944); 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALs OF
WAR CmRnmALS (United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1949) 200-02.
86. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1254.
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in finding her guilty, the life sentence was determined only by a majority
of six against three. One of the dissenters voted for the death sentence,
but the other two voted for a short term of imprisonment. 87
In the writer's opinion it was not necessarily erroneous to reduce
her original sentence, but it was an erroneous extreme of leniency to
reduce it to a term of only four years of imprisonment. This, the writer
believes, was utterly inadequate despite her relatively minor role in the
administration of the Buchenwald camp, since the circumstance was
to be considered as highly aggravating that she had acted as a volun-
teer in her baneful intermeddling with the treatment of the pri-
soners. The report of the Senate committee would seem to go to the
other extreme. It concludes that in the absence of mitigating circum-
stances in her case, the death sentence was the only punishment properly
applicable to her and that it was therefore a flagrant mistake to reduce
the life sentence.8 8 Such reasoning appears to neglect the fact that not
only aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but also the extent of
participation in the charged criminal design had to be taken into con-
sideration in determining the degree of guilt of a defendant in the Buch-
enwald case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nobody will deny that human justice is fallible. This is primarily
due to the fallibility of testimony on which it depends,8 0 sometimes due
to errors of judgment. But miscarriage of justice is certainly a much more
minor evil where a guilty person has been acquitted or too leniently
punished than where an innocent person has been convicted or a guilty
one has been too severely punished.
It has been alleged, rightly or wrongly, that convictions in war crimes
trials were not always properly arrived at, and the only other case where
the United States Senate, by way of an investigation, looked into a war
crimes trial involved a complaint of that kind.0 The sentences meted
87. Id. at 1169, 1170.
88. Report, supra note 4, at 16.
89. See Koessler, Fallibility of Testimony and Judicial Accident Risk, 4 CEzaNAL
L. REv. 56 (1957).
90. MATLZMY MASSACRE INvESiGATiON, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings and Report, U.S. Senate, (1949).
For the denial, in that case, of a petition for habeas corpus, see Everett v. Truman,
334 U.S. 324 (1948).
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out in the war crimes trials are known to have been very severe, and the
Ilse Koch case was probably the only one in which a finally adjudicated
war crimes sentence was criticized as excessively lenient. It has been
mentioned before that in the writer's opinion this criticism was justified.
He also believes that the practical result of the Senate investigation,
whereby Ilse Koch received a life sentence de novo, was not iniquitous
in view of the enormity of the degree of her guilt as revealed in the
subsequent German trial. He cannot help wondering, however, whether
the miscarriage of justice in her case, consisting merely of a too lenient
sentence, was of sufficient importance to necessitate resort to a Senate
investigation.
Although this is not the first time that the relation to the constitu-
tional purpose of such investigations, that is, "to aid in legislating,""1 if
it existed at all, was extremely tenuous and far fetched, the Ilse Koch
investigation is probably singular because of the fact that by its practical
effect it had the character of an extraordinary remedy, as it were, for
the correction of an error in an American final adjudication, to be brought
about by the means of a de novo proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction.
Even if this was all right as a matter of law, it would seem to represent
a most curious phenomenon in the field of legislative investigations as
well as in that of foreign relations.
91. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US. 1M5 (1927).
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